Abstract: Van Gelder's specification of the dynamical hypothesis does not improve on previous notions. All three key attributes of dynamical systems apply to Turing machines and are hence too general. However, when a more restricted definition of a dynamical system is adopted, it becomes clear that the dynamical hypothesis is too underspecified to constitute an interesting cognitive claim.
In brief, definition 4 states that dynamical systems are continuous deterministic systems, but once we realize that this is the fundamental claim, then it is clear that the dynamical hypothesis is simply too underspecified to be of any interest.
The computational hypothesis does not merely say that the mind is discrete at a high level of analysis. Instead, it applies a theory of symbolic computation of enormous theoretical richness and practical power. However, the dynamical hypothesis does merely state that the system is continuous -it says nothing about how it works, aside from the trivial truth that it should be studied using the diverse tools of dynamical systems theory. In short, the dynamical hypothesis has the same status that a putative "discrete hypothesis" concerning the mind would have had before Turing, von Neumann, and development of digital, symbolic computation: that is, it would be almost completely devoid of substance.
